Effects of limited interactions between individuals on cooperation in spatial evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game
Effects of limited interactions between individuals on cooperation in spatial evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game
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DOI：
10.1016/j.chaos.2013.07.015
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发表时间：
2013-11
影响因子：
7.8
通讯作者：
Xu-Sheng Liu;Jian-Yue Guan;Zhi-Xi Wu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Xu-Sheng Liu;Jian-Yue Guan;Zhi-Xi Wu
我们研究了有限交互的空间进化囚徒困境博弈，通过引入两类随机分布在正方形格子上的个体，比如A型个体和B型个体，它们的分数分别为p和（1 −p）。每类个体都可以采取两种纯策略：要么合作，要么背叛。在进化过程中，个体只能与同类的其他个体互动，但它们可以向最近邻的任何一种个体学习。用MonteCarlo模拟方法计算了平衡态下配合物的平均频率ρ C。结果表明，与p = 0（系统中只存在一类个体）的情况相比，合作得到了明显的促进。特别是，合作者密度可以达到一个最大水平，在一些温和的值在一个广泛的支付参数。研究结果表明，某些有限的个人之间的相互作用起着重要的和不平凡的作用，在合作的演变。
We study the spatial evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game with limited interactions by introducing two kinds of individuals, say type-A and type-B with a fraction ofpand (1 −p), respectively, distributed randomly on a square lattice. Each kind of individuals can adopt two pure strategies: either to cooperate or to defect. During the evolution, the individuals can only interact with others belonging to the same kind, but they can learn from either kinds of individuals in the nearest neighborhood. Using Monte Carlo simulations, the average frequency of cooperatorsρCis calculated as a function ofpin the equilibrium state. It is shown that, compared with the case ofp= 0 (only one kind of individuals existing in the system), cooperation can be evidently promoted. In particular, the cooperator density can reach a maximum level at some moderate values ofpin a wide range of payoff parameters. The results imply that certain limited interactions between individuals plays an important and nontrivial role in the evolution of cooperation.