Competition in crime deterrence
Competition in crime deterrence
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DOI：
10.2307/136273
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发表时间：
1997-11-01
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Marceau, N
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Marceau, N
本文研究了各司法管辖区在消除犯罪方面的竞争。在一个故事中，犯罪分子选择他们犯罪的司法管辖区，而司法管辖区选择用于威慑的资源数量以保护当地生产，在另一个故事中，犯罪分子不能改变司法管辖区，但他们可以抢劫移动的资本的所有者。司法管辖区选择用于遏制当地犯罪的资源数量，以确保财产权和吸引资本。在这两个故事中，司法管辖区之间的竞争导致相对于帕累托最优水平的过度威慑。
This paper studies competition between jurisdictions in the eradication of crime. In one story, criminals choose the jurisdiction in which they will commit their crimes while jurisdictions choose the amount of resources devoted to deterrence to protect local production, In another story, the criminals cannot change jurisdiction but they can rob the owners of mobile capital. Jurisdictions choose the amount of resources devoted to the deterrence of local crime so as to secure property rights and to attract capital. In both stories, competition between jurisdictions leads to overdeterrence relative to the Pareto optimal level.