OUTCOME BIAS IN DECISION EVALUATION

OUTCOME BIAS IN DECISION EVALUATION
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DOI:
10.1037/0022-3514.54.4.569
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发表时间:
1988-04-01
影响因子:
7.6
通讯作者:
HERSHEY, JC
HERSHEY, JC
中科院分区:
心理学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
BARON, J;HERSHEY, JC

文献摘要

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在5项研究中,本科受试者被告知他人在不确定条件下所做决策的描述和结果。决定要么涉及医疗问题,要么涉及金钱赌博。受试者对决策的思维质量、决策者的能力或他们让决策者代表他们做出决定的意愿进行评分。受试者了解他们拥有决策者可用的所有相关信息。受试者认为思维更好,认为决策者更有能力,或者在结果有利时比在结果不利时更愿意做出决定。在金钱赌博中,当未选择的选项结果不佳时,受试者认为这种想法比结果良好时更好。尽管被问到的受试者认为他们在进行这些评价时不应该考虑结果,但他们还是这样做了。结果知识对评价的影响可以部分地解释为它对选择的每一方的论点的显著性的影响。合理性理论和实际情况的影响进行了讨论。
In 5 studies, undergraduate subjects were given descriptions and outcomes of decisions made by others under conditions of uncertainty. Decisions concerned either medical matters or monetary gambles. Subjects rated the quality of thinking of the decisions, the competence of the decision maker, or their willingness to let the decision maker decide on their behalf. Subjects understood that they had all relevant information available to the decision maker. Subjects rated the thinking as better, rated the decision maker as more competent, or indicated greater willingness to yield the decision when the outcome was favorable than when it was unfavorable. In monetary gambles, subjects rated the thinking as better when the outcome of the option not chosen turned out poorly than when it turned out well. Although subjects who were asked felt that they should not consider outcomes in making these evaluations, they did so. This effect of outcome knowledge on evaluation may be explained partly in terms of its effect on the salience of arguments for each side of the choice. Implications for the theory of rationality and for practical situations are discussed.