The interplay of emotion expressions and strategy in promoting cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma
The interplay of emotion expressions and strategy in promoting cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma
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DOI：
10.1038/s41598-020-71919-6
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发表时间：
2020-09-11
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
Terada, Kazunori
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
de Melo, Celso M.;Terada, Kazunori
几十年来，重复的囚徒困境一直被用来研究人类的合作。最近发现的勒索和慷慨的策略重新引起了人们对策略在塑造这种困境中的行为中的作用的兴趣。但如果玩家可以感知彼此的情绪表达呢？尽管越来越多的证据表明，情绪信号影响决策，情绪在这个困境中的影响大多被忽视。在这里，我们表明，情绪表达温和的慷慨策略的效果，增加或减少合作，根据信号传达的意图;相比之下，表达勒索没有影响参与者的行为，揭示了高度竞争的策略的局限性。我们提供的证据表明，这些影响主要是介导的推断别人的意图，从战略和情绪。这些发现提供了对合作的行为策略和情感信号的价值以及限制的洞察。
The iterated prisoner's dilemma has been used to study human cooperation for decades. The recent discovery of extortion and generous strategies renewed interest on the role of strategy in shaping behavior in this dilemma. But what if players could perceive each other's emotional expressions? Despite increasing evidence that emotion signals influence decision making, the effects of emotion in this dilemma have been mostly neglected. Here we show that emotion expressions moderate the effect of generous strategies, increasing or reducing cooperation according to the intention communicated by the signal; in contrast, expressions by extortionists had no effect on participants' behavior, revealing a limitation of highly competitive strategies. We provide evidence that these effects are mediated mostly by inferences about other's intentions made from strategy and emotion. These findings provide insight into the value, as well as the limits, of behavioral strategies and emotion signals for cooperation.