Cross-Border Shopping and the Optimum Commodity Tax in a Competitive and a Monopoly Market
Cross-Border Shopping and the Optimum Commodity Tax in a Competitive and a Monopoly Market
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竞争垄断市场下的跨境购物与最优商品税
DOI：
10.2307/3440496
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发表时间：
1994
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
V. Christiansen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
V. Christiansen
使用部分均衡模型，商品税的最优性规则，来自一个经济体，是暴露于跨境购物。在竞争性市场中，传统的逆弹性规则是有效的条件，这是国内需求的弹性，而不是总需求的问题。在外国垄断的情况下，税收转移效应改变了反向弹性。如果供应商是一家多国公司，则应考虑到国外的价格影响。还审查了国外制定的价格和税收对国内税收的影响。版权所有1994年由斯堪的纳维亚经济学杂志的编辑。
Using a partial equilibrium model, optimality rules for a commodity tax are derived for an economy that is exposed to cross-border shopping. In a competitive market, the conventional inverse elasticity rule is shown to be valid with the qualification that it is the elasticity of domestic rather than total demand that matters. With a foreign monopoly, the inverse elasticity is modified by a tax-shifting effect. When the supplier is a multinational firm, price repercussions abroad should be taken into account. The implications for domestic taxation of the prices and taxes set abroad are also examined. Copyright 1994 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.