The scope of sequential screening with ex post participation constraints

The scope of sequential screening with ex post participation constraints
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具有事后参与限制的顺序筛选范围

DOI:
10.1016/j.jet.2020.105055
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发表时间:
2020
影响因子:
1.6
通讯作者:
Weintraub, Gabriel Y.
Weintraub, Gabriel Y.
中科院分区:
经济学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Bergemann, Dirk;Castro, Francisco;Weintraub, Gabriel Y.

文献摘要

相似文献

研究了事后参与约束下的经典序贯筛选问题。因此,卖方必须满足买方事后参与的限制。一个主要的例子是在线展示广告市场,在这个市场中,出版商经常不能使用预付费用,而是使用交易应急费用。我们建立了最优销售机制何时是静态的(买家没有被筛选)或动态的(买家被筛选),并获得了此类合同的完整特征。我们首先在两种类型的指数分布的主要情况下分析我们的模型。给出了静态契约最优性的充要条件。如果这两种类型的平均值足够接近,那么没有筛选是最优的。如果它们之间的距离足够大,那么动态契约就变得最优。重要的是,后一种契约使低类型的买家随机化,而对高类型的买家给予确定性的分配。与卖方提供的合同相比,如果卖方知道买方的类型,这也会使低型更差,而高型更好。我们的主要结果建立了静态契约对于一般分布是最优的充要条件。我们证明了当这一条件失效时,随机选择低型买方的动态契约是最优的。
We study the classic sequential screening problem under ex-post participation constraints. Thus the seller is required to satisfy buyers' ex-post participation constraints. A leading example is the online display advertising market, in which publishers frequently cannot use up-front fees and instead use transaction-contingent fees.We establish when the optimal selling mechanism is static (buyers are not screened) or dynamic (buyers are screened), and obtain a full characterization of such contracts. We begin by analyzing our model within the leading case of exponential distributions with two types. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimality of the static contract. If the means of the two types are sufficiently close, then no screening is optimal. If they are sufficiently apart, then a dynamic contract becomes optimal. Importantly, the latter contract randomizes the low type buyer while giving a deterministic allocation to the high type. It also makes the low type worse-off and the high type better-off compared to the contract the seller would offer if he knew the buyer's type. Our main result establishes a necessary and sufficient condition under which the static contract is optimal for general distributions. We show that when this condition fails, a dynamic contract that randomizes the low type buyer is optimal.