Political coalitions for mutual advantage: The case of the Tobacco Institute's labor management committee
Political coalitions for mutual advantage: The case of the Tobacco Institute's labor management committee
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DOI：
10.2105/ajph.2004.052126
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发表时间：
2005-06-01
影响因子：
12.7
通讯作者：
Pan, J
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Balbach, ED;Barbeau, EM;Pan, J
1984年，烟草工人工会和代表美国烟草公司的烟草协会成立了劳工管理委员会(LMC)。该研究所依靠LMC工会来抵制无烟工作场所的规定。在对目前公开的烟草行业内部文件的审查中，我们发现LMC成功的主要原因有两个。首先，澜湄合作促进了成员国的利益，使它们能够克服政策成功的体制障碍。第二，澜湄合作采用“制度、理念和利益”策略，鼓励非澜湄合作组织反对无烟工作场所的规定。虽然在研究期间，公共卫生倡导者错失了与工会在无烟工作场所问题上合作的机会，但他们可以使用类似的策略与工会结盟。
In 1984, the tobacco workers' union and the Tobacco Institute, which represents US tobacco companies, formed a labor management committee (LMC). The institute relied on LMC unions to resist smoke-free worksite rules.In a review of the internal tobacco industry documents now publicly available, we found that the LMC succeeded for 2 primary reasons. First, the LMC furthered members' interests, allowing them to overcome institutional barriers to policy success. Second, the LMC used an "institutions, ideas, and interests" strategy to encourage non-LMC unions to oppose smoke-free worksite rules.While public health advocates missed an opportunity to partner with unions on the issue of smoke-free worksites during the era studied, they can use a similar strategy to form coalitions with unions.