Values and evidence: how models make a difference
Values and evidence: how models make a difference
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DOI：
10.1007/s13194-017-0180-6
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发表时间：
2018-01-01
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Winsberg, Eric
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Parker, Wendy S.;Winsberg, Eric
我们提请注意非认知价值影响科学证据评估的一种未被充分认识的方式。我们的论点借鉴了科学建模的一些众所周知的特征。我们表明，当科学模型代替贝叶斯和其他概率方法中的背景知识进行证据评估时，结论可能会受到塑造模型开发优先级设置的非认知价值观的影响。此外，纠正这种影响通常是不可行的。我们进一步表明，虽然这种价值影响并不特别容易出现一厢情愿的问题，但在某些情况下它可能会产生有问题的非认知后果。
We call attention to an underappreciated way in which non-epistemic values influence evidence evaluation in science. Our argument draws upon some well-known features of scientific modeling. We show that, when scientific models stand in for background knowledge in Bayesian and other probabilistic methods for evidence evaluation, conclusions can be influenced by the non-epistemic values that shaped the setting of priorities in model development. Moreover, it is often infeasible to correct for this influence. We further suggest that, while this value influence is not particularly prone to the problem of wishful thinking, it could have problematic non-epistemic consequences in some cases.