Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism
Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.02.002
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发表时间：
2006-01-01
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
Sönmez, T
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ergin, H;Sönmez, T
美国的许多学区都采用一种学生分配机制，我们称之为波士顿机制。在这种机制下，学生失去了在学校的优先权，除非他的父母把它列为他们的第一选择。因此，家长们有动机在他们的名单上把学生有很好的入学机会的学校排在前面。我们描述了诱导偏好启示博弈的纳什均衡。我们的结果的一个重要政策含义是，从波士顿机制过渡到学生最优稳定机制将导致明确的效率收益。(c) 2005 Elsevier B.V.版权所有
Many school districts in the U.S. use a student assignment mechanism that we refer to as the Boston mechanism. Under this mechanism, a student loses his priority at a school unless his parents rank it as their first choice. Therefore, parents are given incentives to rank high oil their list the schools where the student has a good chance of getting in. We characterize the Nash equilibria of the induced preference revelation game. An important policy implication of our result is that a transition from the Boston mechanism to the student-optimal stable mechanism would lead to unambiguous efficiency gains. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.