Monopoly pricing in the binary herding model
Monopoly pricing in the binary herding model
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DOI：
10.1007/s00199-007-0313-9
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发表时间：
2008-11-01
期刊：
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Vesterlund, Lise
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bose, Subir;Orosel, Gerhard;Vesterlund, Lise
当垄断者向从彼此的决策中学习的购买者出售产品时，应该如何定价？关注商品的公共价值是二进制的情况，每个买家收到关于该价值的二进制私人信号，我们完全回答了这个问题的所有值的生产成本，买家的信号的精度，和卖方的折扣因子。出乎意料的是，我们发现有一个参数区域，学习在中间和极端信念处停止，而不是在中间和极端信念之间的信念处。
How should a monopolist price when selling to buyers who learn from each other's decisions? Focusing on the case in which the common value of the good is binary and each buyer receives a binary private signal about that value, we completely answer this question for all values of the production cost, the precision of the buyers' signals, and the seller's discount factor. Unexpectedly, we find that there is a region of parameters for which learning stops at intermediate and at extreme beliefs, but not at beliefs that lie between those intermediate and extreme beliefs.