Securing Circuits and Protocols against 1/poly(k) Tampering Rate
Securing Circuits and Protocols against 1/poly(k) Tampering Rate
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-642-54242-8_23
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发表时间：
2014-02
期刊：
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通讯作者：
Dana Dachman-Soled;Y. Kalai
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文献类型：
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作者：
Dana Dachman-Soled;Y. Kalai
在这项工作中，我们提出了一个有效的编译器，转换任何电路C到一个是弹性篡改1/poly（k）分数的电线，其中是一个安全参数无关的大小的原始电路|C|.我们的篡改模型类似于Ishaiet等人提出的模型。（Eurocrypt，2006），其中篡改对手可以篡改电路中的任何导线（只要篡改导线的总数是有界的），通过将其设置为0或1，或通过与之切换。我们的结果改进了Ishaiet al。它只允许对手篡改1/|C|我们的结果建立在Dachman-Soled和Kalai（Crypto，2012）的最新结果上，他们在这个模型中构建了篡改弹性电路，容忍恒定的篡改率。然而，他们的篡改对手可能会学到很多位的敏感信息。在这项工作中，我们避免了敏感信息的泄漏，同时仍然允许泄漏率与电路大小无关。我们提到Dachman-Soled和Kalai（Crypto，2012）的结果仅适用于布尔电路（输出单个位），对于输出kbits的电路，其篡改率为1/O（k）。因此对于密码电路（输出kbits），我们的结果严格优于（Dachman-Soled and Kalai，Crypto，2012）。在这项工作中，我们还展示了如何通过构建一个通用的2方计算协议来将这一结果推广到两方协议的设置（对于任何功能）对于篡改对手是安全的，除了破坏一方之外，这些人还可以篡改诚实方的计算的1/poly（k）-分数的线路和在协议期间传送的比特。
In this work we present an efficient compiler that converts any circuitCinto one that is resilient to tampering with 1/poly(k) fraction of the wires, wherekis a security parameterindependentof the size of the original circuit |C|. Our tampering model is similar to the one proposed by Ishaiet al.(Eurocrypt, 2006) where a tampering adversary may tamper with any wire in the circuit (as long as the overall number of tampered wires is bounded), by setting it to 0 or 1, or by toggling with it. Our result improves upon that of Ishaiet al.which only allowed the adversary to tamper with 1/|C| fraction of the wires.Our result is built on a recent result of Dachman-Soled and Kalai (Crypto, 2012), who constructed tamper resilient circuits in this model, tolerating aconstanttampering rate. However, their tampering adversary may learn logarithmically many bits of sensitive information. In this work, we avoid this leakage of sensitive information, while still allowing leakage rate that isindependentof the circuit size. We mention that the result of Dachman-Soled and Kalai (Crypto, 2012) is only for Boolean circuits (that output a single bit), and for circuits that outputkbits, their tampering-rate becomes 1/O(k). Thus for cryptographic circuits (that outputkbits), our result strictly improves over (Dachman-Soled and Kalai, Crypto, 2012).In this work, we also show how to generalize this result to the setting of two-party protocols, by constructing a general 2-party computation protocol (for any functionality) that is secure against a tampering adversary, who in addition to corrupting a party may tamper with 1/poly(k)-fraction of the wires of the computation of the honest party and the bits communicated during the protocol.