Who must pay bribes and how much? Evidence from a cross section of firms
Who must pay bribes and how much? Evidence from a cross section of firms
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DOI：
10.1162/00335530360535180
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发表时间：
2003-02-01
影响因子：
13.7
通讯作者：
Svensson, J
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Svensson, J
本文使用了一个独特的数据集，包含定量信息的乌干达公司的贿赂支付的腐败。这些数据有两个显著特点：并非所有公司都报告需要行贿，而且面临类似制度/政策的公司之间报告的贪污情况存在相当大的差异。我们提出了一个解释，这些模式的基础上，在控制权和议价能力的公司之间的差异。与控制权/讨价还价的假设一致，我们发现，腐败的发生率可以解释的政策/法规的变化，跨行业。行贿企业必须支付多少？将腐败的定量数据与被调查公司的详细财务信息相结合，我们发现，公司的“支付能力”和公司的“拒绝能力”可以解释贿赂报告公司之间的差异的很大一部分。这些结果表明，公职人员作为价格（贿赂）歧视，公共服务的价格部分确定，以榨取贿赂。
This paper uses a unique data set on corruption containing quantitative information on bribe payments of Ugandan firms. The data have two striking features: not all firms report that they need to pay bribes, and there is considerable variation in reported graft across firms facing similar institutions/policies. We propose an explanation for these patterns, based on differences in control rights and bargaining strength across firms. Consistent with the control rights/ bargaining hypotheses, we find that the incidence of corruption can be explained by the variation in policies/regulations across industries. How much must bribe-paying firms pay? Combining the quantitative data on corruption with detailed financial information from the surveyed firms, we show that firms' "ability to pay" and firms' "refusal power" can explain a large part of the variation in bribes across graft-reporting firms. These results suggest that public officials act as price (bribe) discriminators, and that prices of public services are partly determined in order to extract bribes.