Deflating Logical Consequence
Deflating Logical Consequence
复制标题
削弱逻辑后果
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.678.x
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Lionel Shapiro
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lionel Shapiro
关于真理的通货紧缩主义者试图破坏关于真理本质的辩论，他们认为真理谓词只是一种允许我们表达某种普遍性的手段。我认为，一个平行的方法是可用的逻辑后果的情况下。正如关于真理的紧缩论提供了一种替代真理的性质的符合或理由的帐户，关于后果的紧缩论承诺一个替代模型论或证明论的帐户的后果的性质。然后，我认为，反对菲尔德和比尔提出的考虑，咖喱的悖论并不排除关于结果的紧缩主义，就像说谎者悖论排除关于真理的紧缩主义一样。
Deflationists about truth seek to undermine debates about the nature of truth by arguing that the truth predicate is merely a device that allows us to express a certain kind of generality. I argue that a parallel approach is available in the case of logical consequence. Just as deflationism about truth offers an alternative to accounts of truth's nature in terms of correspondence or justification, deflationism about consequence promises an alternative to model-theoretic or proof-theoretic accounts of consequence's nature. I then argue, against considerations put forward by Field and Beall, that Curry's paradox no more rules out deflationism about consequence than the liar paradox rules out deflationism about truth.