Transportation service procurement in periodic sealed double auctions with stochastic demand and supply
Transportation service procurement in periodic sealed double auctions with stochastic demand and supply
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DOI：
10.1016/j.trb.2013.07.015
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发表时间：
2013-10
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Subo Xu;G. Huang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Subo Xu;G. Huang
本文提出了一个双向拍卖模型来研究动态单车道运输环境下的运输服务采购问题。虽然本文的动机是一个第三方物流电子市场，基本模型是适用于一般的双边交换环境。我们首先解决TSP在运输现货市场随机，但平衡或“对称”的需求和供应。提出了一种周期性密封双向拍卖（PSDA）的TSP。利用整合考虑可能出价和/或出价的打包方法，我们设计了一个改进的PSDA（M-PSDA）来解决具有“非对称”需求和供给的TSP问题，我们证明了PSDA和M-PSDA都实现了激励相容和渐近有效。此外，拍卖人可能会获得更高的利润从PSDA与一个相对较短的拍卖长度。在供需不对称条件下，最优拍卖长度随供需不平衡程度的增加而增加。然而，当最大化社会福利或托运人和承运人（代理人）的效用时，以相对较大的拍卖长度运行拍卖（PSDA或M-PSDA）是最优的。最后，当供需不平衡程度较低时，供需不平衡下拍卖人的短视最优期望单位时间利润大于供需对称下的最优期望单位时间利润。但在供需不平衡条件下，代理人的单位时间期望效用随着供需不平衡程度的增加而显著降低，从而导致市场效率降低。
This paper presents a double auction model to study transportation service procurement (TSP) in a dynamic single-lane transportation environment. Although this paper is motivated by a third-party logistics e-marketplace, the underlying model is applicable in the general bilateral exchange contexts. We first address TSP in a transportation spot market with stochastic but balanced or “symmetric” demand and supply. A periodic sealed double auction (PSDA) is proposed for TSP. Using apacking approachthat considers possible bids and/or asks in an integral manner, we then devise a modified PSDA (M-PSDA) to address TSP with “asymmetric” demand and supply.We show that both PSDA and M-PSDA realize incentive compatibility and asymptotic efficiency. Also, the auctioneer is likely to gain higher profits from PSDA with a relatively short auction length. Under asymmetric demand and supply, this optimal auction length increases with the degree of supply–demand imbalance. However, it is optimal to run the auction (either PSDA or M-PSDA) with a relatively large auction length, when maximizing either the social welfare or the utility of shippers and carriers (agents). Finally, when the degree of supply–demand imbalance is low, the auctioneer’smyopic optimalexpected profit per unit of time under supply–demand imbalance is larger than that under symmetric demand and supply. But the agents’ expected utility per unit of time under supply–demand imbalance significantly decreases when the degree of supply–demand imbalance increases, thereby resulting in a lower market efficiency.