Environmental research joint ventures and time-consistent emission tax: Endogenous choice of R&D formation
Environmental research joint ventures and time-consistent emission tax: Endogenous choice of R&D formation
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DOI：
10.1016/j.econmod.2016.01.025
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发表时间：
2016-06
影响因子：
4.7
通讯作者：
Yasunori Ouchida;Daisaku Goto
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yasunori Ouchida;Daisaku Goto
本文为环境R&D形成的内生选择提供了一个新的分析框架。此外，本文提出了四种类型的环境R&D的古诺双头垄断的设置，监管机构没有预先承诺能力的排放税的检查。研究结果表明，在环境破坏程度较轻、环境破坏程度较重、环境R&D成本效率较低的情况下，环境R & D合作企业卡特尔的社会福利高于环境R&D竞争、环境R&D卡特尔和环境R & D合作企业竞争三种情形。但是，如果环境破坏严重，企业的R&D费用有限，则与以往的研究结果形成鲜明对比，尽管R& D竞争是没有信息共享和R&D协调的情况，但环境R& D竞争在社会上上级其他三种情况。
This paper provides a new analytical framework of endogenous choice for environmental R&D formation. Furthermore, this paper presents an examination of environmental R&D of four types in a Cournot duopoly in a setting where a regulator has no precommitment ability for an emission tax. Results reveal that if the environmental damage is slight, or given severe environmental damage and large inefficiency in environmental R&D costs, then social welfare under environmental research joint venture (ERJV) cartelization is higher than in the other three scenarios: environmental R&D competition, environmental R&D cartelization, and ERJV competition. However, if environmental damage is severe, and if a firm's R&D costs are limited, then, in stark contrast to results of previous studies, environmental R&D competition is socially superior to any of the other three scenarios, although R&D competition is a case without information sharing and R&D coordination.