Horizontal Mergers with Free Entry
Horizontal Mergers with Free Entry
复制标题
自由进入的横向合并
DOI：
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Mukherjee
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Davidson;A. Mukherjee
我们考虑了在自由进入和退出的情况下横向合并的影响。与之前关于横向合并的许多文献相比，我们的模型得出的预测似乎是直观合理的：只有适度的成本协同效应，少数行业参与者的合并是有益的（即使在数量竞争下），不存在“搭便车问题”，因为内部人员总是比外部人员受益更多，数量设定和价格设定游戏产生类似的预测。我们还发现，所有对个人有利的并购也对社会有利。
We consider the impact of horizontal mergers in the presence of free entry and exit. In contrast to much of the previous literature on horizontal mergers, our model yields predictions that seem intuitively reasonable: with only moderate cost synergies mergers of a small number of industry participants are beneficial (even under quantity competition), there is no "free rider problem" in that insiders always benefit more than outsiders, and quantity-setting and price-setting games yield similar predictions. We also find that all privately beneficial mergers are also socially beneficial.