Experimental Analysis of Attacks on Next Generation Air Traffic Communication
Experimental Analysis of Attacks on Next Generation Air Traffic Communication
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-642-38980-1_16
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发表时间：
2013-06
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Matthias Schäfer;Vincent Lenders;I. Martinovic
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Matthias Schäfer;Vincent Lenders;I. Martinovic
这项工作研究基于广播自动相关监视（ADS-B）的下一代空中交通监视技术的安全性。 ADS-B 已得到大多数国际飞机的支持，并将于 2020 年成为全球大多数空域的强制要求。虽然众所周知，ADS-B 可能容易受到不同的欺骗攻击，但发起这些攻击的复杂性和影响一直受到空中交通管制界的争议。然而，文献对于在现实环境中发起 ADS-B 攻击的要求以及影响其可行性的限制仍不清楚。在本文中，我们采用科学方法系统地评估现实的 ADS-B 攻击。我们的目标是阐明不同威胁的实用性，并量化影响此类攻击成功的主要因素。我们的结果揭示了一些坏消息：对 ADS-B 的攻击成本低廉且非常成功。我们使用受控实验设计，从现实世界的可行性分析中得出见解，得出这样的结论：任何安全关键的空中交通决策过程不应完全依赖 ADS-B 系统。
This work studies the security of next generation air traffic surveillance technology based on Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B). ADS-B is already supported by a majority of international aircraft and will become mandatory in 2020 for most airspaces worldwide. While it is known that ADS-B might be susceptible to different spoofing attacks, the complexity and impact of launching these attacks has been debated controversially by the air traffic control community. Yet, the literature remains unclear on the requirements of launching ADS-B attacks in real-world environments, and on the constraints which affect their feasibility. In this paper, we take a scientific approach to systematically evaluate realistic ADS-B attacks. Our objective is to shed light on the practicability of different threats and to quantify the main factors that impact the success of such attacks. Our results reveal some bad news: attacks on ADS-B can be inexpensive and highly successful. Using a controlled experimental design, we offer insights from a real-world feasibility analysis that leads to the conclusion that any safety-critical air traffic decision process should not rely exclusively on the ADS-B system.