A Simple Model of Contract Enforcement Institutions
A Simple Model of Contract Enforcement Institutions
复制标题
合同执行机构的简单模型
DOI：
10.1111/1468-0106.12090
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Akihisa Shibata
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Takuma Kunieda;Keisuke Okada;Akihisa Shibata
我们证明，在高生产率的经济体中，合同执行机构是内生建立的，合伙合同纠正了低效的土地分配。然而，在生产力较低的经济体，没有建立这种机构，也没有形成伙伴关系合同。在中等生产率水平的经济体中，存在多个纳什均衡，即在高纳什均衡中建立合同执行制度，而在低纳什均衡中不形成。在这种情况下，各经济体的体制质量可能各不相同。我们还证明，制度质量的改善减少了国家内部的不平等。所有这些结果都与跨国观察结果一致。
We demonstrate that in highly productive economies contract enforcement institutions are endogenously established, and partnership contracts correct inefficient land allocation. In less productive economies, however, such institutions are not established, and partnership contracts are not formed. In economies with intermediate productivity levels, multiple Nash equilibria exist; that is, contract enforcement institutions are established in the high Nash equilibrium whereas they are not formed in the low Nash equilibrium. In this case, institutional quality can be diverse across economies. We also prove that improvement in institutional quality reduces within‐country inequality. All these outcomes are consistent with cross‐country observations.