Human strategy updating in evolutionary games
Human strategy updating in evolutionary games
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DOI：
10.1073/pnas.0912515107
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发表时间：
2010-02-16
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
Milinski, Manfred
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Traulsen, Arne;Semmann, Dirk;Milinski, Manfred
进化游戏动力学不仅描述了频率依赖性的遗传进化，还描述了人类的文化进化。在这种情况下，成功的战略通过模仿传播。研究表明，策略更新规则的细节对理论模型中的进化动力学具有至关重要的影响，例如，可以显著改变社会困境中的合作水平。什么样的策略更新规则可以描述人类的模仿动态？在这里，我们提出了一种方法来衡量这样的策略更新规则的行为实验。我们使用一种设置，其中个人实际上是安排在一个空间网格。这产生了大量不同的战略情况，我们可以从中评估战略更新。最重要的是，对应于突变或探索行为的自发策略变化比许多模型中假设的更频繁。我们的实验方法来测量理论模型中使用的更新机制的属性将是有用的文化进化的数学模型。
Evolutionary gamedynamics describe not only frequency-dependent genetic evolution, but also cultural evolution in humans. In this context, successful strategies spread by imitation. It has been shown that the details of strategy update rules can have a crucial impact on evolutionary dynamics in theoretical models and, for example, can significantly alter the level of cooperation in social dilemmas. What kind of strategy update rules can describe imitation dynamics in humans? Here, we present a way to measure such strategy update rules in a behavioral experiment. We use a setting in which individuals are virtually arranged on a spatial lattice. This produces a large number of different strategic situations from which we can assess strategy updating. Most importantly, spontaneous strategy changes corresponding to mutations or exploration behavior are more frequent than assumed in many models. Our experimental approach to measure properties of the update mechanisms used in theoretical models will be useful for mathematical models of cultural evolution.