Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions
Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions
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DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.002
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发表时间：
2014-03-01
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Funaki, Y.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kamijo, Y.;Nihonsugi, T.;Funaki, Y.
本研究探讨两个集中式惩罚机构的线性公共物品博弈。这些机构要求一定的贡献水平，并制裁贡献不足的参与者。两者的不同之处在于，在那些不符合这一要求的人中，谁会受到制裁。在一个机构中，所有违规者都受到制裁，而在另一个机构中，只有最严重的违规者受到制裁。从理论上讲，在相同的要求和制裁水平下，后一种制度的公共产品博弈产生的贡献等于或大于前一种制度。实验结果支持了这一理论预测。然而，理论和实验室观察之间存在差异，因为具有理论上最优需求的机构并没有产生最高利润。(C)2014爱思唯尔公司All rights reserved.
This study investigates two centralized punishment institutions for a linear public goods game. These institutions require a certain contribution level and sanction under-contributing players. The two differ in who, among those who do not meet this requirement, receive sanctions. In one institution, all violators are sanctioned, and in the other, only the worst violator(s) is sanctioned. Theoretically, the public goods game of the latter institution yields contributions equal to or greater than that of the former institution with the same requirement and sanction level. The results of an experiment support this theoretical prediction. However, there is a discrepancy between the theory and laboratory observations in that the institution with the theoretically optimal requirement did not yield the highest profit. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.