Is Institutional Ownership Associated with Earnings Management and the Extent to Which Stock Prices Reflect Future Earnings?

Is Institutional Ownership Associated with Earnings Management and the Extent to Which Stock Prices Reflect Future Earnings?
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机构所有权与盈余管理以及股价反映未来盈利的程度是否相关?

DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.163433
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发表时间:
1999
期刊:
Corporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
J. Jiambalvo
J. Jiambalvo
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Shivaram Rajgopal;M. Venkatachalam;J. Jiambalvo

文献摘要

被引文献

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金融媒体上的文章表明,机构投资者过度关注短期盈利能力,导致管理者操纵收益,担心短期利润的失望将导致机构清算其持有的股票。然而,本文表明,可操纵应计利润的绝对值下降与机构所有权。这一结果与管理者认识到机构所有者比个人投资者更了解情况是一致的,这降低了管理应计项目的预期收益。我们还发现,随着机构所有权的增加,股票价格往往反映了更大比例的信息,在未来的收益相对于当前的收益。这一结果与机构投资者与个人投资者相比超越当前收益的观点是一致的。总的来说,这些结果提供了强有力的证据,表明管理人员不会因为过度关注短期盈利能力的机构投资者的压力而操纵收益。
Articles in the financial press suggest that institutional investors are overly focused on short-term profitability leading mangers to manipulate earnings fearing that a short-term profit disappointment will lead institutions to liquidate their holdings. This paper shows, however, that the absolute value of discretionary accruals declines with institutional ownership. The result is consistent with managers recognizing that institutional owners are better informed than individual investors, which reduces the perceived benefit of managing accruals. We also find that as institutional ownership increases, stock prices tend to reflect a greater proportion of the information in future earnings relative to current earnings. This result is consistent with institutional investors looking beyond current earnings compared to individual investors. Collectively, the results offer strong evidence that managers do not manipulate earnings due to pressure from institutional investors who are overly focused on short-term profitability.