Complementarities in Organizational Design: Empirical Evidence from the New Economy
Complementarities in Organizational Design: Empirical Evidence from the New Economy
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组织设计的互补性：来自新经济的经验证据
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.357822
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
S. Widener
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Elizabeth Demers;M. Shackell;S. Widener
经济理论认为，企业组织设计的不同组成部分之间存在互补性(Milgrom和Roberts(1992))。除了Nagar(2002)考察了管理控制系统的两个组成部分--激励性薪酬和委托--的共同决定外，很少有实证研究支持这种理论化的企业结构。我们扩展了Nagar(2002)，考察了Jensen和Meckling(1976)以及Brickley，Smith和Zimmerman(1995)确定的公司组织架构的所有三个组成部分的互补性：业绩衡量、激励性薪酬和决策权的分配。我们建立了一个结构方程模型来检验B2C互联网企业样本中三个要素相互依赖的假设，并找到了强有力的证据来支持企业组织设计的三个组成部分相互依赖的猜想。我们还提供了关于知识专用性、企业战略、控制范围以及各种所有权和治理特征在企业组织架构设计中的作用的证据。
Economic theory suggests that there are complementarities between the various components of a firm's organizational design (Milgrom and Roberts (1992)). With the exception of Nagar (2002) which examines the joint determination of two components of the management control system, incentive compensation and delegation, there is very little empirical research to support this theorized structure of the firm. We extend Nagar (2002) by examining the complementarities across all three components of the firm's organizational architecture as identified by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman (1995): performance measurement, incentive compensation, and the allocation of decision rights. We develop a structural equation model to test the hypothesis that the three elements are interdependent for a sample of business-to-consumer Internet firms and find strong evidence to support the conjecture that the three components of the firms' organizational design are interdependent. We also provide evidence on the role of knowledge specificity, firm strategy, span of control, and various ownership and governance characteristics in the design of the firm's organizational architecture.