SIMULATION STUDY OF INCOME-TAX EVASION
SIMULATION STUDY OF INCOME-TAX EVASION
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DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(78)90008-7
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发表时间：
1978-01-01
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
RUTENBERG, A
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
FRIEDLAND, N;MAITAL, S;RUTENBERG, A
在游戏模拟环境中，观察了 15 名受试者的逃税行为。人们发现，巨额罚款比频繁的审计更有效。少报收入的决定似乎受到与少报程度不同的因素的影响。个人之间的逃税行为差异很大。
In a game-simulation context, tax evasion behavior of 15 subjects was observed. Large fines were found to be more effective deterrents than frequent audits. The decision to underreport income appears to be influenced by different factors than the magnitude of underreporting. Tax evasion behavior differed widely among individuals.