Implications of Channel Structure for Leasing or Selling Durable Goods
Implications of Channel Structure for Leasing or Selling Durable Goods
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DOI：
10.1287/mksc.1080.0458
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发表时间：
2009-09
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. Bhaskaran;S. Gilbert
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Bhaskaran;S. Gilbert
尽管许多耐用产品是通过经销商销售的，但文献在很大程度上忽略了产品耐用性如何影响制造商和经销商之间的互动的问题。我们试图通过考虑一家耐用品制造商来填补这一空白，该制造商使用独立经销商将其产品提供给消费者。与大多数文献相反，我们特别考虑了这样一种可能性，即如果制造商出售其产品，那么经销商可以将其出售或出租给最终消费者。我们的一个更有趣的发现是，当经销商之间的竞争激烈时，制造商更愿意使用租赁-经纪安排，在这种安排中，经销商通过在制造商和最终消费者之间经纪租赁赚取利润，而不是将其产品出售给经销商。这补充了现有的结果表明，当耐用品供应商直接与消费者互动，销售是高水平的竞争强度的主导战略。
In spite of the fact that many durable products are sold through dealers, the literature has largely ignored the issue of how product durability affects the interactions between a manufacturer and her dealers. We seek to fill this gap by considering a durable goods manufacturer that uses independent dealers to get her product to consumers. In contrast to much of the literature, we specifically consider the possibility that if the manufacturer sells her product, then the dealers can either sell or lease it to the final consumer. One of our more interesting findings is that, when the level of competition among dealers is high, the manufacturer prefers to use a lease-brokering arrangement in which the dealers earn a margin for brokering leases between the manufacturer and end consumers, instead of selling her product to the dealers. This complements existing results that show that when suppliers of durable goods interact directly with consumers, selling is the dominant strategy for high levels of competitive intensity.