The Political Economy
The Political Economy
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政治经济学
DOI：
10.4324/9780429273247-4
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Reginald J. Harrison
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Reginald J. Harrison
1995年，继乌拉圭回合贸易谈判之后，世界贸易组织（WTO）诞生。世贸组织的基础设施包括争端解决谅解（DSU），这是一个强制性的争端解决机制。从1995年成立到2002年7月，DSU处理了262起案件，影响了国际贸易义务的内容。然而，尽管DSU在贸易体系中发挥着核心作用，但我们才刚刚开始了解DSU如何影响国家行为和诉讼模式。特别值得注意的是，我们在世贸组织没有一个连贯的诉讼和和解模式，可以解释为什么有些案件达成和解，而另一些案件却没有。本文提供了这样一个模型。在国内背景下，诉讼和和解模式依赖于信息不对称。然而，在世贸组织，解释所观察到的结算模式所需的信息假设是不现实的，因此必须探索另一种办法。卷入WTO诉讼的国家的相关成本和收益本质上是政治性的。因此，一方享有的利益不太可能等于另一方承担的成本。无论是专家组裁决的影响，还是WTO体系内固有的拖延的影响，都是如此。这两个因素都会影响到一个国家的政治领导人得到的回报。这篇论文展示了这些不对称的政治回报是如何影响提交给专家组的案件池的。在产生专家组裁决的82起案件中，90%的结果是原告胜诉。将这一惊人的高胜率与本文中提出的理论相结合，可以让我们推断出各国在决定是和解还是诉诸仲裁时所面临的政治成本和利益。wto诉讼与和解的政治经济学
In 1995, following the Uruguay Round of trade talks, the World Trade Organization (WTO) came into being. Included in the infrastructure of the WTO was the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), a mandatory dispute resolution system. From its inception in 1995 through July 2002, the DSU handled 262 cases and affected the content of international trade obligations. Despite its central role in the trading system, however, we are only just beginning to understand how the DSU affects state behavior and litigation patterns. Of particular note, we do not have a coherent model of litigation and settlement at the WTO that can explain why some cases settle while others do not. This paper provides such a model. In the domestic context, models of litigation and settlement turn on informational asymmetries. At the WTO, however, the informational assumptions required to explain the observed pattern of settlement are unrealistic, so an alternative approach must be explored. The relevant costs and benefits for a state involved in WTO litigation are political in nature. As such, benefits enjoyed by one party are unlikely to equal the costs borne by the other. This is true of both the impact of a panel ruling, and the impact of the delay that is built into the WTO system. Both of these factors affect the payoffs received by a state’s political leaders. This paper shows how these asymmetric political payoffs affect the pool of cases that proceeds to a panel. Of the 82 cases that have generated a panel ruling, 90% have resulted in a complainant win. Combining this remarkably high win rate with the theory developed in this article allows us to draw inferences about the political costs and benefits facing states as they decide whether to settle or proceed to a panel. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT AT THE WTO