A limited defense of moral perception
A limited defense of moral perception
复制标题
对道德认知的有限辩护
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Justin P. McBrayer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Justin P. McBrayer
拒绝道德实在论的一个流行的理由是缺乏一个合理的认识论来解释我们如何认识道德事实。最近，一些哲学家坚持认为，有可能以一种非常直接的方式获得道德知识--通过感知。然而，对道德知觉的可能性有一个重要的反对意见：我们似乎不可能有一个代表道德属性的知觉经验，但是通过知觉来知道X是F的一个必要条件是有一个知觉经验的能力，这个知觉经验把某个东西代表为F。我们把这称为对道德感知的“表征反对”。在本文中，我认为，代表反对道德知觉失败。因此，我对道德感知进行了有限的辩护。
One popular reason for rejecting moral realism is the lack of a plausible epistemology that explains how we come to know moral facts. Recently, a number of philosophers have insisted that it is possible to have moral knowledge in a very straightforward way—by perception. However, there is a significant objection to the possibility of moral perception: it does not seem that we could have a perceptual experience that represents a moral property, but a necessary condition for coming to know that X is F by perception is the ability to have a perceptual experience that represents something as being F. Call this the ‘Representation Objection’ to moral perception. In this paper I argue that the Representation Objection to moral perception fails. Thus I offer a limited defense of moral perception.