Research Note - When Is Versioning Optimal for Information Goods?
Research Note - When Is Versioning Optimal for Information Goods?
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DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.1070.0773
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发表时间：
2008-05
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
H. Bhargava;Vidyanand Choudhary
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
H. Bhargava;Vidyanand Choudhary
本文提供了关于版本控制何时是信息商品的最佳策略的见解。我们对这类商品的描述是，可变成本不随质量而变化，包括零可变成本的特殊情况。我们的分析假设一个垄断企业在市场上有一个现有的产品，并有机会通过引入额外的低质量版本来细分市场。我们推导出一个简单的决策规则，用于确定基于解决方案的单产品最大化问题的最优版本。当单独提供的低质量版本的最佳市场份额大于单独提供的高质量版本的最佳市场份额时，版本控制是最佳的。如果一个公司能够设计出一种低质量的信息产品，并且相对于他们对高端版本的估价，高类型消费者对低质量产品的相对估价低于低类型消费者，那么它就可以为信息产品使用版本管理，从而获得利润。当可变成本增加时，只提供一个产品版本的公司不必考虑增加另一个版本。当可变成本下降时，公司应该尝试增加一个低质量的版本。
This paper provides insights about when versioning is an optimal strategy for information goods. Our characterization of this class of goods is that variable costs are invariant with quality, including the special case of zero variable costs. Our analysis assumes a monopoly firm that has an existing product in the market and has an opportunity to segment the market by introducing additional lower-quality versions. We derive a simple decision rule for determining the optimality of versioning based on the solution to a single-product maximization problem. Versioning is optimal when the optimal market share of the lower-quality version, offered alone, is greater than the optimal market share of the high-quality version, offered alone. A firm can profitably employ versioning for an information good if it can design the lower quality in a way that, relative to their valuations for the high-end version, high-type consumers have a lower relative valuation for the lower quality than do low-type consumers. When variable costs increase, a firm that offered only one product version need not consider adding another version. When variable costs decrease, the firm should explore adding a lower-quality version.