Simultaneous Signaling and Screening with Warranties
Simultaneous Signaling and Screening with Warranties
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DOI：
10.1509/jmkr.40.2.176.19228
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发表时间：
2003-05
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
D. Soberman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Soberman
众所周知，卖家可以利用保修来筛选消费者，增加利润。保证书发出信号的能力也被广泛接受。作者考虑了一种情况，在这种情况下，一个高质量的卖方需要保修政策，以屏幕和信号。通过一个分析模型，我们的目标是确定一个高品质的卖方，提供一个基本的保修和可选的延长保修的产品，其质量是不可观察到的买家的最佳策略。作者发现，信号可以限制卖方的筛选能力，特别是当买家愿意支付更高的质量显着溢价。为了发出信号，卖方通常会延长基本保修期，缩短可选范围，使每种类型的买方的捆绑产品越来越相似。作者还提供了一个实证应用模型在多伦多二手车市场。
It is well known that sellers can use warranties to screen consumers and increase profits. The ability of warranties to signal is also well accepted. The author considers a situation in which a high quality seller needs warranty policy to both screen and signal. Through an analytical model, the objective is to identify the optimal strategy for a high quality seller that offers a base warranty and optional extended warranty for a product whose quality is not observable to buyers. The author finds that signaling can limit a seller's ability to screen, especially when buyers are willing to pay a significant premium for higher quality. To signal, the seller generally lengthens base warranties and shortens optional coverage, making the bundles for each type of buyer more and more similar. The author also provides an empirical application of the model in the Toronto used-car market.