Spoofing GPS Receiver Clock Offset of Phasor Measurement Units

Spoofing GPS Receiver Clock Offset of Phasor Measurement Units
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DOI:
10.1109/tpwrs.2013.2240706
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发表时间:
2013-02
影响因子:
6.6
通讯作者:
Xichen Jiang;Jiangmeng Zhang;B. Harding;J. Makela;A. Domínguez-García
Xichen Jiang;Jiangmeng Zhang;B. Harding;J. Makela;A. Domínguez-García
中科院分区:
工程技术1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Xichen Jiang;Jiangmeng Zhang;B. Harding;J. Makela;A. Domínguez-García

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我们论证了对相量测量单元(PMU)的GPS接收机进行欺骗攻击的可行性。我们将攻击表述为一个优化问题,其目标是在攻击前后最大化PMU接收机时钟偏移(相对于机载卫星时钟测量的GPS时间)之间的差异。由于PMU使用此时钟偏移量来计算其测量的同步时间戳,因此接收器时钟偏移量中的错误会在PMU提供的电压或电流相位测量中引入成比例的相位误差。对于最一般的情况,优化问题中的决策变量是卫星的星历、伪距和接收机的地心定地(ECEF)坐标。对约束进行了强制转换,使得从优化问题的解中计算出的决策变量和卫星位置都接近于攻击前的值,从而避免可能的检测方案检查这些变量的值是否有大的跳跃。我们证明了欺骗攻击对任意数量的可见卫星都是可行的。为了说明这种欺骗攻击的影响,我们给出了仿真结果,其中攻击在依赖于pmu提供的测量相位信息的实时电压稳定性监测算法中引起错误。
We demonstrate the feasibility of a spoofing attack on the GPS receiver of a phasor measurement unit (PMU). We formulate the attack as an optimization problem where the objective is to maximize the difference between the PMU's receiver clock offset (with respect to the GPS time measured by the onboard satellite clocks) before and after the attack. Since the PMU uses this clock offset to compute a synchronized time stamp for its measurements, an error in the receiver clock offset introduces a proportional phase error in the voltage or current phase measurements provided by the PMU. For the most general case, the decision variables in the optimization problem are the satellites' ephemerides, pseudoranges, and the receiver's Earth-Centered Earth-Fixed (ECEF) coordinates. The constraints are cast such that the decision variables and the satellite positions computed from the solution of the optimization problem are close to their pre-attack values, so as to avoid possible detection schemes that check for large jumps in the values of these variables. We show that the spoofing attack is feasible for any number of visible satellites. As an illustration of the impact of such spoofing attacks, we present simulation results in which the attack induces errors in a real-time voltage stability monitoring algorithm that relies on the phase information from measurements provided by PMUs.