Demand Analysis Using Strategic Reports: An Application to a School Choice Mechanism
Demand Analysis Using Strategic Reports: An Application to a School Choice Mechanism
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DOI：
10.3982/ecta13615
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发表时间：
2018-03-01
期刊：
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Somaini, Paulo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Agarwal, Nikhil;Somaini, Paulo
一些学区使用的分配系统鼓励学生歪曲自己的偏好。我们在剑桥发现了与策略行为相一致的证据。这样的策略会使偏好分析复杂化。本文发展了实证方法，研究随机效用模型在一个新的和大类的择校机制。我们表明，偏好的非参数化确定下，无论是在选择环境或偏好移位足够的变化。然后，我们开发了一个易于处理的估计程序，并将其应用到剑桥。据估计，虽然83%的学生被分配到他们的第一选择，只有72%的学生被分配到他们真正的第一选择，因为学生避免排名竞争激烈的学校。假设学生表现最佳，平均学生倾向于立即接受机制，而不是推迟接受机制，相当于0.08英里。如果信念有偏差，估计的差异较小，如果学生如实报告偏好，则相反。
Several school districts use assignment systems that give students an incentive to misrepresent their preferences. We find evidence consistent with strategic behavior in Cambridge. Such strategizing can complicate preference analysis. This paper develops empirical methods for studying random utility models in a new and large class of school choice mechanisms. We show that preferences are nonparametrically identified under either sufficient variation in choice environments or a preference shifter. We then develop a tractable estimation procedure and apply it to Cambridge. Estimates suggest that while 83% of students are assigned to their stated first choice, only 72% are assigned to their true first choice because students avoid ranking competitive schools. Assuming that students behave optimally, the Immediate Acceptance mechanism is preferred by the average student to the Deferred Acceptance mechanism by an equivalent of 0.08 miles. The estimated difference is smaller if beliefs are biased, and reversed if students report preferences truthfully.