Making Policy Stick: Why the Government Gets What It Wants in Multiparty Parliaments
Making Policy Stick: Why the Government Gets What It Wants in Multiparty Parliaments
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坚持政策：为什么政府能在多党议会中得到它想要的东西
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发表时间：
2001
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通讯作者：
William B. Heller
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作者：
William B. Heller
多党联盟制定政策的能力是一个谜。无论他们在政策上多么接近，在选举时，政党都会为了有限的选票而相互竞争。由于立法联盟模糊了政党之间的差异，政党竞争的普遍性回避了一个问题，即是什么让联盟团结起来通过法律。Huber（1996 a）和其他人最近的研究强调了首相利用信任投票来使反叛的联盟成员保持一致的能力。然而，将信心附加到法案上可能会有问题，在某些情况下甚至是自杀。我认为，在立法过程的后期，当没有其他人可以提出立法修正案时，有权保护法案福尔斯的管辖权。这一“最后提议”的权力将制定联盟结合在一起，使部长既可以限制她因敌对修正案而遭受的损失，又可以利用政策结果惩罚偏离联盟的政党。多数决原则是民主立法的最基本特征之一。在没有政党控制立法多数的地方，联合政府或少数政府是不可避免的。联盟可以是暂时的，正如少数党政府所预期的那样，也可以是更永久的，旨在解决广泛的问题。然而，它们不是偶然形成的。各政党结成有明确目标的联盟，并与其他联盟成员谈判其参与的条件。由此产生的协议充满了紧张气氛。无论他们在政策上多么接近，政党在选举时都会为有限的选票而相互竞争。由于一个政党获得的选票等于所有其他政党都得不到的选票，1选举竞争迫使各政党采取不同于甚至至少部分反对与之合作最密切的其他政党的立场。因为争夺同一批选民支持的政党不太可能有相同的政策目标（Marsh and Mitchell，1999，49），任何联盟协议都必然带有冲突的种子。联盟中固有的紧张关系回避了他们如何设法通过法律的问题。促使联盟伙伴彼此保持距离的动机威胁到政府的稳定和政府决定立法内容的能力。总的来说，对于任何一项法案，多数党联盟中至少有一些成员面临着寻求替代政策的诱惑，而这种替代政策对其联盟伙伴的吸引力较小。尽管如此，他们并不经常放弃他们的交易。为什么不呢？我在这里认为，“最后提议”修正案的权力保护政府免于失去对立法内容的控制，并被迫看着它不喜欢的法案成为法律。
The ability of multiparty coalitions to make policy is a puzzle. However closely they agree on policy, at election time parties compete against each other for a limited pool of votes. Since legislative alliances blur differences between parties, the ubiquity of party competition begs the question of what holds coalitions together to pass laws. Recent work by Huber (1996a) and others highlights the Prime Minister's ability to use the vote of confidence to keep rebellious coalition members in line. Attaching confidence to bills can be problematic, however, even suicidal under some circumstances. I argue that the authority to offer legislative amendments late in the process, when no one else can, protects the Minister in whose jurisdiction a bill falls. This "last-offer" authority holds enacting coalitions together and allows the Minister both to limit her losses from hostile amendments and use policy outcomes to punish parties that stray from the coalition fold. M i ,[ ajority rule is one of the most basic characteristics of democratic legislatures. Where no party controls a legislative majority, coaL g 1lition or minority governments are unavoidable. Coalitions can be temporary, as might be expected for minority governments, or they can be more permanent and designed to endure across a broad range of issues. They do not form by chance, however. Parties enter into coalitions with explicit goals and negotiate with the other coalition members the terms of their participation. The resulting agreements are fraught with tension. No matter how closely they agree on policy, parties compete against each other for a limited pool of votes at election time. As a vote gained by one party is a vote denied to all others,1 electoral competition forces parties to stake out positions different from and at least in part opposed even to those other parties with which they work most closely. Because parties competing for the support of the same set of voters are unlikely to have identical policy goals (Marsh and Mitchell 1999, 49), any coalition agreement necessarily carries the seeds of conflict. The tension inherent in coalitions begs the question of how they manage to pass laws. The incentive for coalition partners to distance themselves from one another threatens both government stability and government's ability to determine legislative content. In general, for any given bill, at least some members of the majority coalition face a temptation to seek an alternative policy less attractive to their coalition partners. Nonetheless, they do not often abandon their bargain. Why not? I argue here that the authority to make "last offer" amendments protects the government from losing control of legislative content and being forced to watch bills it dislikes become law.2 A Minister who can make last-offer amendments can hold the original coalition to its agreed program through judicious distribution of policy benefits.