The Normative Implications of Recent Empirical Neuroethics Research on Moral Intuitions
The Normative Implications of Recent Empirical Neuroethics Research on Moral Intuitions
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DOI：
10.1007/s12152-021-09465-9
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发表时间：
2021-04-06
期刊：
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Dubljevic, Veljko
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Dubljevic, Veljko
经验神经伦理学模型一直都有规范性的野心。旧的模型（例如，双重过程）试图揭穿传统的道德理论，而新的模型（例如，ADC 模型）试图将其经验和规范主张与传统道德理论相适应。与社会科学方法论在道德直觉上的使用有关的规范意义问题仍然悬而未决。本文分析了“是/应该”差距以及有影响力的建构主义方法的经验基础，以论证经验神经伦理学模型的规范野心并不一定总是被误导。作者阐明了如何将合法的规范含义与过度扩张分开，并认为通过区分自然事实、社会事实和社会建构，道德直觉可以用作伦理学的事实基础。最终，道德可以通过自然科学和社会科学进行富有成果的研究和指导，而彻底的伦理反思也应该为实证研究提供指导。
Empirical neuroethics models have always had normative ambitions. Older models (e.g., dual process) attempted to debunk traditional moral theories, whereas newer models (e.g., ADC model) attempt to fit their empirical and normative claims with them. The issue of normative significance as it pertains to the use of social science methodology on moral intuitions remains open. This paper analyzes the Is/Ought gap and the empirical underpinnings of influential constructivist approaches in order to argue that the normative ambitions of empirical neuroethics models are not necessarily always misguided. The author clarifies how legitimate normative implications can be dissociated from overreaches and argues that moral intuitions could be used as the factual basis for ethics by employing the distinction between natural facts, social facts, and social constructs. Ultimately, morality can be fruitfully studied and informed by natural and social sciences and, thorough ethical reflection, ought also to inform empirical research.