An Analysis of Corporate Leniency Programs and Lessons to Learn for US and EU Policies∗
An Analysis of Corporate Leniency Programs and Lessons to Learn for US and EU Policies∗
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美国和欧盟政策的企业宽大计划分析及教训*
DOI：
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Walzl
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Feess;M. Walzl
我们开发了一个模型来比较美国和欧盟制定的针对卡特尔行为的宽大处理计划。尽管所有这些项目都是基于这样一种理念，即通过减少对自我报告公司的罚款，可以增加预期的事前罚款，但它们在如何在法律上实施这一基本理念方面存在很大差异。不同之处包括对第一次和第二次自举报人的罚款减免，所提供证据数量的作用，以及案件是否已经在调查中的影响。我们详细阐述了信息不对称的作用，以得出最优的宽大程度，并利用我们的发现来比较美国和欧盟的项目。凝胶分类：D62， D82, H50, K42
We develop a model to compare leniency programs for cartel behavior as enacted, for instance, in the USA and the EU. Although all such programs are based on the idea that the expected fine ex ante can be increased by granting fine reductions for self-reporting firms, they differ considerably in how this basic idea is legally implemented. Differences include the fine reductions granted for first and second selfreporters, the role of the amount of evidence provided, and the impact of whether the case is already under investigation. We elaborate on the role of asymmetric information to derive the optimal degree of leniency, and we make use of our findings to compare the programs in the US and the EU. JEL-Classification: D62, D82, H50, K42