Cross-Border Tax Evasion after the Common Reporting Standard: Game Over?
Cross-Border Tax Evasion after the Common Reporting Standard: Game Over?
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通用报告标准后的跨境逃税：游戏结束了吗？
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3245144
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Barbara Stage
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Elisa Casi;C. Spengel;Barbara Stage
早在 2013 年，自动信息交换 (AEOI) 就被认可为打击跨境逃税的普遍通用解决方案。对此，OECD推出了AEOI全球标准，即共同报告标准（CRS）。目前，约有 100 个司法管辖区已承诺到 2018 年将其纳入各自的国家法律。在本研究中，我们采用双重差分研究设计来分析 CRS 对跨境逃税的影响。通过考虑四年（2014-2017）的时间段，结果表明，CRS 导致出于逃税目的而存放在离岸地点的跨境存款减少了 14%。此外，这些财富和相关收入并没有被遣返，而是出现了一个逃避国内纳税义务的新地点。更具体地说，随着CRS在国内的实施，美国（美国）作为全球唯一尚未承诺加入CRS的主要经济体，似乎成为跨境逃税的潜在吸引力地点。
Back in 2013, the Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI) was endorsed as the prevailing universal solution to fight cross-border tax evasion. In this regard, the OECD launched a global standard for the AEOI, the Common Reporting Standard (CRS). Currently, around 100 jurisdictions have committed to implement it into respective national laws by 2018. In this study, we analyze the impact of the CRS on cross-border tax evasion using a difference-in-difference research design. By considering a period of four years (2014-2017), results suggest that the CRS induced a reduction of 14% in cross-border deposits parked in offshore locations for tax evasion purposes. Moreover, such wealth and related income has not been repatriated but rather a new location to avoid domestic tax obligations has emerged. More specifically, upon the CRS implementation at domestic level, the United States (U.S.), i.e. the only major economy in the world, which so far did not commit to the CRS, seems to emerge as a potentially attractive location for cross-border tax evasion.