Conflict monitoring in dual process theories of thinking
Conflict monitoring in dual process theories of thinking
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DOI：
10.1016/j.cognition.2007.06.002
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发表时间：
2008-03-01
期刊：
影响因子：
3.4
通讯作者：
Glumicic, Tamara
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
De Neys, Wim;Glumicic, Tamara
流行的双过程理论将人类思维描述为直觉-启发式和需求-分析推理过程之间的相互作用。虽然监测这两个系统的产出是否存在冲突对于避免决策错误至关重要，但对这一过程的效率仍有一些大相径庭的看法。书名/作者：Reach of[Kahneman，D.有限理性地图：直觉判断和选择的视角。诺贝尔奖演讲。检索自：http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2002/kahnemann-lecture.pdf]and Evans[Evans，J.St.B.T.(1984)]。推理中的启发式和分析性处理。例如，英国心理学杂志，75,451-468]，声称对启发式系统的监控通常相当松懈，而其他如Sloman[Sloman，S.A.(1996)]。两种推理系统的经验案例。心理学公报，119，3-22]和爱泼斯坦[爱泼斯坦，S.(1994)]。认知潜意识和心理动力潜意识的整合。美国心理学家声称它是无懈可击的，人们在发生冲突时通常会经历一场“知道的”和“感觉的”之间的斗争。本研究对比了这些观点。参与者在大声思考的同时解决了典型的基本比率忽视问题。在这些问题中，刻板的描述提示了与基于分析基本比率信息的反应相冲突的反应。口头协议没有显示出明确经历过的冲突的直接证据。正如卡纳曼和埃文斯预测的那样，参与者几乎从来没有提到过基本利率，他们的判断似乎完全基于启发式推理。然而，更隐含的冲突检测措施，如参与者在未经宣布的回忆测试中检索基本比率信息，决策延迟，以及审查基本比率的倾向，表明基本比率已得到彻底处理。在基本费率和说明不冲突的控制问题上，情况并非如此。结果表明，虽然冲突检测的流行特征是所有积极经历的斗争都可以质疑，但仍有证据支持Sloman和Epstein关于监控无懈可击的基本主张。每当基本利率和描述不一致时，人们就会发现这种冲突，并因此将注意力转向对基本利率进行更深层次的处理。讨论了双重过程框架和合理性辩论的含义。(C)2007 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。
Popular dual process theories have characterized human thinking as an interplay between an intuitive-heuristic and demanding-analytic reasoning process. Although monitoring the output of the two systems for conflict is crucial to avoid decision making errors there are some widely different views on the efficiency of the process. Kahneman [Kahneman, D. (2002). Maps of bounded rationality: A perspective on intuitive judgement and choice. Nobel Prize Lecture. Retrieved January 11, 2006, from: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2002/kahnemann-lecture.pdf] and Evans [Evans, J. St. B. T. (1984). Heuristic and analytic processing in reasoning. British Journal of Psychology, 75, 451-468], for example, claim that the monitoring of the heuristic system is typically quite lax whereas others such as Sloman [Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 3-22] and Epstein [Epstein, S. (1994). Integration of the cognitive and psychodynamic unconscious. American Psychologists, 49, 709-724] claim it is flawless and people typically experience a struggle between what they "know" and "feel" in case of a conflict. The present study contrasted these views. Participants solved classic base rate neglect problems while thinking aloud. In these problems a stereotypical description cues a response that conflicts with the response based on the analytic base rate information. Verbal protocols showed no direct evidence for an explicitly experienced conflict. As Kahneman and Evans predicted, participants hardly ever mentioned the base rates and seemed to base their judgment exclusively on heuristic reasoning. However, more implicit measures of conflict detection such as participants' retrieval of the base rate information in an unannounced recall test, decision making latencies, and the tendency to review the base rates indicated that the base rates had been thoroughly processed. On control problems where base rates and description did not conflict this was not the case. Results suggest that whereas the popular characterization of conflict detection as ail actively experienced struggle can be questioned there is nevertheless evidence for Sloman's and Epstein's basic claim about the flawless operation of the monitoring. Whenever the base rates and description disagree people will detect this conflict and consequently redirect attention towards a deeper processing of the base rates. Implications for the dual process framework and the rationality debate are discussed. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.