One-to-Many Matching with Complementary Preferences : An Empirical Study of Natural Gas Lease Quality and Market Power ∗
One-to-Many Matching with Complementary Preferences : An Empirical Study of Natural Gas Lease Quality and Market Power ∗
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偏好互补的一对多匹配：天然气租赁质量与市场力量的实证研究*
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发表时间：
2016
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通讯作者：
Ashley Vissing
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作者：
Ashley Vissing
在一个有私人承包的双边市场中，空间集中的成本和收益是什么？石油和天然气租赁市场有助于研究两种抵消力量的净效应。首先，公司受益于签署与大面积，连续面积相关的合同，因为它允许他们申请钻井许可证，并进入更有利可图的油井开发阶段。第二，在地理市场上竞争对手较少的公司向谈判伙伴提供的合同条件不太理想，使他们能够在消费品市场上行使与价格加价平行的市场支配力。使用独特的数据描述的位置和内容的私人租赁，我模型的私人承包行为的公司签署天然气租赁与土地所有者作为一个一对多，不可转让的效用匹配。为了估计空间互补性的影响，我扩展了匹配框架，以允许更复杂的偏好之间的公司价值集的地理集中的租赁。我还提出证据表明，企业行使市场力量的金钱和非金钱的合同条款。然后，我使用该模型来探讨反事实的政策，限制合同的行为，要求租赁，包括一个更理想的菜单的条款，土地所有者的影响。我发现，虽然限制增加了公司的合同成本，公司的反应，选择谈判伙伴与更好的钻井属性（例如。在空间上更加集中的）。要求一个单一的附加条款，使市场双方的合同质量平均回报增加了3.6倍，而统一的租赁政策使租赁平均回报增加了10倍，这意味着福利收益。感谢我的顾问克里斯托弗·蒂明斯（Christopher Timmins）的指导、支持和鼓励。也感谢我的委员会成员，詹姆斯·罗伯茨、柯蒂斯·泰勒、莫迪博·西迪贝和理查德·纽韦尔。也感谢杜克计算机学院的汤姆·米尔德里奇和杜克法学院的赖克·朗斯特，感谢他们有益的讨论和建议。感谢得克萨斯州铁路委员会和塔兰特县评估办公室的工作人员在收集水井和住房/包裹数据方面的指导。本文还参考了Stéphane Bonhomme、Koichiro Ito、Michael Greenstone、Ryan凯洛格、托马斯Covert、Mar Reguant以及杜克大学IO/公共午餐研讨会、芝加哥大学EPIC午餐和初级教师研讨会以及亚利桑那州立大学环境经济学进展会议的与会者的评论和讨论。剩下的任何错误都是我自己的。
In a two-sided market with private contracting, what are the costs and benefits of spatial concentration? The oil and natural gas leasing market facilitates studying the net effect of two countervailing forces. First, firms benefit from signing contracts associated with large, contiguous acreage as it allows them to apply for a permit to drill a well and proceed to more profitable phases of well development. Second, firms with fewer competitors in a geographic market offer less desirable contracting terms to their negotiation partners, allowing them to exercise market power paralleling price markups in consumer product markets. Using unique data describing the location and contents of private leases, I model the private contracting behavior of firms signing natural gas leases with landowners as a one-to-many, non-transferable utility match. To estimate the effect of spatial complementarity, I extend the matching framework to allow for more complex preferences among firms valuing sets of geographically concentrated leases. I also present evidence that firms exercise market power in pecuniary and non-pecuniary contracting terms. I then use the model to explore the effects of counter-factual policies that restrict contracting behavior by requiring leases to include a more desirable menu of terms for landowners. I find that while the restrictions increase firms’ contracting costs, firms respond by choosing negotiation partners with better drilling attributes (ex. proximity to well infrastructure) that are more spatially concentrated. Requiring a single, additional clause increases the average returns from contract quality across the two sides of the market by 3.6 times the returns under the status quo, while a uniform leasing policy increases average returns from leasing 10-fold, which suggests a welfare gain. ∗Thank you to my advisor, Christopher Timmins, for his guidance, support, and encouragement. Thank you also to my committee members, James Roberts, Curtis Taylor, Modibo Sidibe, and Richard Newell. Thank you also to Tom Milldrige at Duke Computing and Ryke Longest at Duke Law School for their helpful discussion and advice. Thank you to personnel at the Texas Railroad Commission and the Tarrant County Appraiser Office for guidance in collecting the well and housing/parcel data. This paper has also benefited from comments from and discussions with Stéphane Bonhomme, Koichiro Ito, Michael Greenstone, Ryan Kellogg, Thomas Covert, Mar Reguant, and participants the IO/Public Lunch Seminar at Duke University, the EPIC Lunch and Junior Faculty Seminars at the University of Chicago, and the Advances in Environmental Economics Conference at Arizona State University. Any remaining errors are my own.