Cosigned vs. group loans
Cosigned vs. group loans
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联署贷款与团体贷款
DOI：
10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.05.006
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发表时间：
2008
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
A. Rai
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Bond;A. Rai
我们分析了使用社会制裁来强制还款的贷款合同，以及借款人施加制裁的能力不同。当制裁能力相似时，对称团体贷款优先于联署贷款；也就是说，当借款人之间的权力关系相对平等时。相反，当权力关系不平等时，联署贷款更受青睐。我们分析了为同一集团成员提供不同贷款条件的集团贷款安排难以实施的原因。我们还证明了对称集团贷款和联名贷款之间的比较对内生匹配具有鲁棒性。
We analyze lending contracts when social sanctions are used to enforce repayments and borrowers differ in their abilities to impose sanctions. Symmetric group loans are preferred to cosigned loans when sanctioning abilities are similar; that is, when the power relation between borrowers is relatively equal. Conversely, cosigned loans are preferred when the power relation is unequal. We analyze why group lending arrangements offering different loan terms to members of the same group are difficult to implement. We also show that our comparison between symmetric group loans and cosigned loans is robust to endogenous matching.
剑桥:剑桥大学出版社
DOI：
--
发表时间：
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期刊：
影响因子：
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作者：
Shirai;Y.. Aspect. In P. C. Hogan (Ed.)
通讯作者：
Y.. Aspect. In P. C. Hogan (Ed.)