Embracing risk dependency in designing cyber-insurance contracts
Embracing risk dependency in designing cyber-insurance contracts
复制标题
DOI：
10.1109/allerton.2017.8262837
复制
发表时间：
2017-10
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Mohammad Mahdi Khalili;Parinaz Naghizadeh Ardabili;M. Liu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Mohammad Mahdi Khalili;Parinaz Naghizadeh Ardabili;M. Liu
我们研究在一个相互依存的网络中设计网络保险政策的问题，在该网络中，一个主体（主要方）的损失不仅取决于其自身的努力，还取决于同一生态系统中其他主体（第三方）的投资和努力（即外部性）。在设计网络保险政策时，传统观点是出于两个原因避免为相互依赖的各方提供保险。首先，同时发生的损失事件会威胁到保险公司的业务和资金。其次，当一起损失事件可归咎于第三方时，主要方的保险公司可以从第三方的保险公司获得赔偿，以降低自身的风险敞口。在这项工作中，我们分析一个相互依存的网络模型，以了解保险公司是应该避免还是接受风险的相互依存性。我们关注两个相互依存的主体，其中一个主体（主要方）的风险取决于另一个主体（第三方），但反之则不然。我们考虑两种可能的情形：一种是保险公司只承保主要方，另一种是主要方的保险公司进一步承保第三方主体。我们表明，主要方的保险公司为两个主体提供保险实际上是有利可图的。此外，我们还表明，为两个主体提供保险不仅能为保险公司带来更高的利润，还能降低总体风险。
We study the problem of designing cyber insurance policies in an interdependent network, where the loss of one agent (a primary party) depends not only on his own effort, but also on the investments and efforts of others (third parties) in the same eco-system (i.e., externalities). In designing cyber insurance policies, the conventional wisdom is to avoid insuring dependent parties for two reasons. First, simultaneous loss incidents threaten the insurer's business and capital. Second, when a loss incident can be attributed to a third party, the insurer of the primary party can get compensation from the insurer of the third party in order to reduce its own risk exposure. In this work, we analyze an interdependent network model in order to understand whether an insurer should avoid or embrace risks interdependencies. We focus on two interdependent agents, where the risk of one agent (primary party) depends on the other agent (third party), but not the other way around. We consider two potential scenarios: one in which an insurer only insures a primary party, and another one in which the insurer of the primary party further insures the third party agent. We show that it is in fact profitable for the primary party's insurer to insure both agents. Further, we show that insuring both agents not only provides higher profit for the insurer, but also reduces the collective risk.