A theory of school‐choice lotteries
A theory of school‐choice lotteries
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DOI：
10.3982/te1558
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发表时间：
2015-05
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Onur Kesten;M. Utku Ünver
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Onur Kesten;M. Utku Ünver
纽约市和波士顿引入了一种新的集中机制，在地区择校计划中将学生分配到公立学校。该机制因其上级公平性而被提倡，除其他外，它取代了其他机制。在本文中，我们介绍了一个新的框架，调查学校选择匹配问题和两个事前公平的概念，在彩票设计，强事前稳定性和事前稳定性。该框架概括了已知的一对多双边和单边匹配模型。我们首先表明，新的纽约/波士顿机制未能满足这些公平性。然后，我们提出了两个新的机制，分数延迟接受机制，这是有序的帕累托主导类强事前稳定机制，和分数延迟接受和交易机制，它满足平等对待平等和约束有序帕累托效率类事前稳定机制。
A new centralized mechanism was introduced in New York City and Boston to assign students to public schools in district school-choice programs. This mechanism was advocated for its superior fairness property, besides others, over the mechanisms it replaced. In this paper, we introduce a new framework for investigating school-choice matching problems and two ex-ante notions of fairness in lottery design, strong ex-ante stability and ex-ante stability. This frame- work generalizes known one-to-many two-sided and one-sided matching models. We first show that the new NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new mechanisms, the fractional deferred-acceptance mechanism, which is ordinally Pareto dominant within the class of strongly ex-ante stable mechanisms, and the fractional deferred- acceptance and trading mechanism, which satisfies equal treatment of equals and constrained ordinal Pareto efficiency within the class of ex-ante stable mechanisms.