On revaluing the currency of human rights
On revaluing the currency of human rights
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论重估人权的货币
DOI：
10.1177/1470594x07081301
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Katherine Eddy
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Katherine Eddy
在最近一系列关于人权概念的反思性著作中，哲学家们关注的是巩固人权话语的分析边界，而不是将福利权利排除在目录之外。文章认为，这些最近的尝试“重估货币”的人权：机构的概念，多元化的概念，和消极的义务概念。它最终捍卫了一种“基于尊严”的人权解释，在这种解释中，任何数量的人类利益和价值观都可以作为一项权利的基础，但不尊重这项权利必须构成对人类尊严（一个人作为一个人的自我价值感）的威胁，才能被视为一项真正的人权。它进一步认为，“基于尊严”的人权解释证明了将重点放在国家作为人权所针对的代理人的合理性，并使我们有理由怀疑国家是否能够通过简单的宽容充分履行其对公民负有的基于人权的义务。根据这里所提供的解释，当国家未能向其成员提供实现其基本需求的手段时，可以说国家侵犯了其成员的权利，威胁了他们的人格尊严。
In a recent spate of reflective writings on the concept of human rights, philosophers have been concerned to firm up the analytical boundaries of human rights discourse, without excluding welfare rights from the catalogue. The article considers three of these recent attempts to `revalue the currency' of human rights: the agency conception, the pluralist conception, and the negative duties conception. It ultimately defends a `dignity-based' account of human rights, in which any number of human interests and values may ground a right, but in which the failure to respect the right must constitute a threat to human dignity (one's sense of self-worth as a person) in order for it to count as a genuine human right. It further argues that a `dignity-based' account of human rights justifies a focus on the state as the agent against which human rights are held, and gives us reason to doubt that the state could adequately fulfil the human-rights-based duties it owes its citizens by simple forbearance. On the account offered here, the state may be said to violate the rights of its members, and to threaten their human dignity, when it fails to provide them with the means to realize their basic needs.