The evolution of bargaining behavior
The evolution of bargaining behavior
复制标题
DOI：
10.1162/003355397555299
复制
发表时间：
1997-05-01
影响因子：
13.7
通讯作者：
Ellingsen, T
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ellingsen, T
本文考察了双边讨价还价行为的进化基础。互动被认为是个人的，在这个意义上，代理人可能会认识到彼此的讨价还价策略。特别是，该模型允许“顽固”的代理，其需求是独立的对手，和“复杂”的代理，谁适应对手的预期发挥之间的互动。当蛋糕的大小确定时，进化倾向于那些坚持至少要分到一半蛋糕的顽固分子。唯一的结果是平分。在足够嘈杂的环境中，复杂的行为与贪婪的顽固行为一起出现在平衡中。因此，冲突的可能性是肯定的。
The paper examines the evolutionary foundations of bilateral bargaining behavior. Interaction is assumed to be personal, in the sense that agents may recognize each others' bargaining strategies. In particular, the model allows interaction between ''obstinate'' agents, whose demands are independent of the opponent, and ''sophisticated' agents, who adapt to their opponent's expected play. When the pie's size is certain, evolution favors obstinate agents who insist on getting at least half the pie. The unique outcome is an equal split. In sufficiently noisy environments, sophisticated behavior appears in equilibrium together with greedy obstinate behavior. There is then a positive probability of conflict.