An Empirical Analysis of Voluntarily Supplied Client-Auditor Realignment Reasons
An Empirical Analysis of Voluntarily Supplied Client-Auditor Realignment Reasons
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自愿提供的客户-审计师调整原因的实证分析
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.246096
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Srinivasan Sankaraguruswamy
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Whisenant;Srinivasan Sankaraguruswamy
在本文中，我们调查了自愿披露的审计师-客户重新调整的原因（如SEC所鼓励的）是否对投资者具有信息内容。在将重组原因分为两种类型-可验证和不可验证，后者代表从其他来源不明显的审计师-客户关系的披露后，我们发现，正如理论信号模型的“好消息”规则所预测的那样，不可验证的重组原因在其公告时与异常收益正相关。我们还调查自愿披露的重组原因是否与前任或继任审计师的相对规模相关。我们发现，客户在解雇大型前任审计师时更有可能引用服务相关（不可验证）的原因，并且在选择小型继任审计师时更有可能引用费用相关（不可验证）的原因。这些调查结果与审计师竞争的结果是一致的。
In this paper we investigate whether voluntarily disclosed reasons for auditor‐client realignments (as encouraged by the SEC) have information content for investors. After classifying realignment reasons into two types—verifiable and non‐verifiable, with the latter representing disclosures about the auditor‐client relationship not evident from alternative sources—we find that, as predicted by the “good news” precept of theoretical signaling models, non‐verifiable realignment reasons are positively associated at the time of their announcement with abnormal returns. We also investigate whether voluntarily disclosed realignment reasons are associated with the relative size of the predecessor or successor auditor. We find that clients are more likely to cite service‐related (non‐verifiable) reasons when dismissing large predecessor auditors, and are more likely to cite fee‐related (non‐verifiable) reasons when choosing small successor auditors. These findings are consistent with auditors competing for the cli...