EQUILIBRIA UNDER ACTIVE AND PASSIVE MONETARY AND FISCAL-POLICIES
EQUILIBRIA UNDER ACTIVE AND PASSIVE MONETARY AND FISCAL-POLICIES
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DOI：
10.1016/0304-3932(91)90007-b
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发表时间：
1991-02-01
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
LEEPER, EM
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
LEEPER, EM
货币政策和财政政策的相互作用研究在一个随机最大化模型。政策是“主动”还是“被动”取决于其对政府债务冲击的反应。为赤字融资的计划以及均衡的存在性和唯一性取决于两个政策参数。该模型用于：（i）描述各种融资方案所隐含的均衡，（ii）得出财政行为决定货币冲击如何影响价格的政策，（iii）重新解释弗里德曼1948年的政策框架。本文重新考虑了名义利率钉住时价格不确定的结论。该设置可以用来解释财政融资的简化形式的研究。
Monetary and fiscal policy interactions are studied in a stochastic maximizing model. Policy is ‘active’ or ‘passive’ depending on its responsiveness to government debt shocks. Schemes for financing deficits and, therefore, the existence and uniqueness of equilibria depend on two policy parameters. The model is used to: (i) characterize the equilibria implied by various financing schemes, (ii) derive policies where fiscal behavior determines how monetary shocks affect prices, and (iii) reinterpret Friedman's 1948 policy framework. The paper reconsiders the result that prices are indeterminate when the nominal interest rate is pegged. The setup can be used to interpret reduced-form studies on fiscal financing.