Illegal Trojan design and detection in asynchronous NULL Convention Logic and Sleep Convention Logic circuits
Illegal Trojan design and detection in asynchronous NULL Convention Logic and Sleep Convention Logic circuits
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DOI：
10.1049/cdt2.12047
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发表时间：
2022-09
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Kushal K. Ponugoti;S. Srinivasan;S. Smith;Nimish Mathure
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文献类型：
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作者：
Kushal K. Ponugoti;S. Srinivasan;S. Smith;Nimish Mathure
在网络战中，检测硬件特洛伊木马，即可能泄漏数据并降低性能的恶意数字电路组件，是一个紧迫的问题。准延迟不敏感异步数字电路，例如空约定逻辑（NCL）和睡眠约定逻辑，也称为多阈值空约定逻辑（MTNCL），具有固有的安全特性和对温度大波动的弹性，这使得它们对极端环境应用非常有吸引力，例如空间探索，汽车，本文展示了如何利用NCL和MTNCL中使用的双轨编码来设计特洛伊木马，使用现有方法无法检测到。给出了特洛伊木马的一般威胁模型。还提供了能够在注册-传输-级别准确检测特洛伊木马的正式验证方法。通过在NCL和MTNCL Rivest‐Shamir‐Adleman（RSA）解密电路中嵌入木马来测试检测方法。将该方法应用于不同数据路径宽度的25个NCL和25个MTNCL RSA基准测试，检测率为100%。
With Cyber warfare, detection of hardware Trojans, malicious digital circuit components that can leak data and degrade performance, is an urgent issue. Quasi‐Delay Insensitive asynchronous digital circuits, such as NULL Convention Logic (NCL) and Sleep Convention Logic, also known as Multi‐Threshold NULL Convention Logic (MTNCL), have inherent security properties and resilience to large fluctuations in temperatures, which make them very alluring to extreme environment applications, such as space exploration, automotive, power industry etc. This paper shows how dual‐rail encoding used in NCL and MTNCL can be exploited to design Trojans, which would not be detected using existing methods. Generic threat models for Trojans are given. Formal verification methods that are capable of accurate detection of Trojans at the Register‐Transfer‐Level are also provided. The detection methods were tested by embedding Trojans in NCL and MTNCL Rivest‐Shamir‐Adleman (RSA) decryption circuits. The methods were applied to 25 NCL and 25 MTNCL RSA benchmarks of various data path width and provided 100% rate of detection.