When people are more logical under cognitive load - Dual task impact on scalar implicature
When people are more logical under cognitive load - Dual task impact on scalar implicature
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DOI：
10.1027/1618-3169.54.2.128
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发表时间：
2007-01-01
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Schaeken, Walter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
De Neys, Wim;Schaeken, Walter
本研究采用双重任务法检验了语用学理论中关于含意性质的两种相反的心理加工预测。在人类交际中，当听话人从语用角度理解话语，超越话语的逻辑意义时，通常会出现含义。新格赖斯观点（例如，Levinson，2000）认为含意是自动产生的，而关联理论（Sperber & Wilson，1986/1995）认为含意是努力的而不是自动的。参与者被提出了一个句子验证任务与信息不足的句子，有可能产生标量含义，如一些橡树是树。根据一些解释的性质（逻辑或语用），判断句子是真还是假。执行认知资源的实验负担的复杂的点模式在解释过程中的并发记忆。结果表明，在负荷下，受试者的语用解释次数较少，逻辑解释次数较多。研究结果为关联理论的观点提供了直接的支持。
The present study introduces dual task methodology to test opposing psychological processing predictions concerning the nature of implicatures in pragmatic theories. Implicatures routinely arise in human communication when hearers interpret utterances pragmatically and go beyond the logical meaning of the terms. The neo-Gricean view (e.g., Levinson, 2000) assumes that implicatures are generated automatically whereas relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995) assumes that implicatures are effortful and not automatic. Participants were presented a sentence verification task with underinformative sentences that have the potential to produce scalar implicatures like Some oaks are trees. Depending on the nature of the interpretation of Some (logical or pragmatic) the sentence is judged true or false. Executive cognitive resources were experimentally burdened by the concurrent memorization of complex dot patterns during the interpretation process. Results showed that participants made more logical and fewer pragmatic interpretations under load. Findings provide direct support for the relevance theory view.