On Pramāasamuccayavtti 6AB Again
On Pramāasamuccayavtti 6AB Again
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再次论 Pramāasamuccayavtti 6AB
DOI：
10.1007/s10781-005-2586-2
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发表时间：
2005
影响因子：
0.3
通讯作者：
E. Franco
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Franco
[...] [1]参见[...]如果精神意识在它之后生起，它就不是自我认识的。49.4详细的批评和评论已经私下传达给他，可能会在他即将出版的关于svasam的专著中考虑：vedana。[5]同上，第57页及各处。632我反对阅读迪格纳加斯文本中的感知类型学。为什么说“欲”就是“欲”呢？一种精神感知因为它属于那个物种（即精神感知的物种），由于自我意识的一般属性。如果我们仍然不愿意根据姚明的心血来潮来修改迪格纳加斯的文本，我们一定会认为他对迪格纳加斯四种感知类型的解释是没有根据的。莱比锡大学印度学与中央科学研究所，邮编：21 04109德国莱比锡，电子邮件：franco@ rz。莱比锡大学。de 10目前，上述声明载于第56.9页以下。
[...] 1 Cf.[...] it is not self-cognizant if the mental consciousness arises after it. 3 Ibid. p. 70, n. 49.4 Detailed criticism and comments have been communicated to him privately and may be taken into consideration in his forthcoming monograph on svasam: vedana. 5 Ibid. p. 57 and passim. 632I was arguing against reading a typology of perception into Dignagas text. Why is the self-awareness of [desire, etc.] a mental perception? Because it belongs to that species (ie, the species of mental perception) owing to the general property of [being] selfawareness. If we thus remain disinclined to modify Dignagas text according to Yaos whim, we are bound to dismiss his interpretation of Dignagas four types of perception as unfounded. Institut fur Indologie und Zentralasienwissenschaften Universitat LeipzigBurgstrasse 21 04109 Leipzig Deutschland E-mail: franco@ rz. uni-leipzig. de10 At the present the above statement appears on p. 56.9 f.