Structural Analysis of Manufacturer Pricing in the Presence of a Strategic Retailer
Structural Analysis of Manufacturer Pricing in the Presence of a Strategic Retailer
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DOI：
10.1287/mksc.20.3.244.9764
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发表时间：
2001-06
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
K. Sudhir
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Sudhir
消费品制造商通常通过普通的独立零售商向消费者销售他们的品牌。对这种渠道结构的理论研究分析了制造商-零售商互动(垂直战略互动)假设下渠道成员的最优行为。经验产业组织的研究主要集中在分析制造商之间的竞争互动(横向战略互动)。决策支持系统对零售商定价规则做出了各种假设(例如，恒定加价、品类利润最大化)。然而，这些关于战略行为的假设对任何特定市场是否合适，都是一个经验性问题。因此，本文实证推导了(1)制造商和零售商之间的垂直战略相互作用(VSI)，(2)制造商与零售商之间同时存在的横向战略相互作用(HSI)，以及(3)零售商使用的定价规则。研究人员通常无法获得批发价。即使是能够获得自己批发价的制造商，通常也对竞争对手的批发价知之甚少。在没有批发价的情况下，我们利用博弈论求解技术，在纵向和横向战略相互作用和零售商定价规则的特定假设下，推导出批发价公式。然后我们将批发价的公式嵌入到估计方程中。虽然我们的经验说明使用的是没有批发价的扫描仪数据，但模型本身可以在有批发价的情况下应用。早期关于制造商在使用扫描仪数据设定批发价时推断HSI的研究(例如，Kadiyali等人)。1996、1999)提出了零售商收取固定利润的简化假设。这一假设使他们能够推断批发价格，并分析制造商之间的竞争互动。在这篇文章中，我们证明了这个模型在计量经济学上等同于一个衡量品牌间零售价格协调的模型。因此，零售商的协调定价(品类管理)可能会夸大制造商之间的合作。我们找到了对这一论点的实证支持。这凸显了在零售层面使用数据时，需要同时正确地建模和推断VSI，以准确地估计HSI。需求的函数形式已根据模型与销售数据的适配性进行了评估。但最近对渠道的理论研究(Lee和Staelin 1997，Tyagi 1999)表明，功能形式对零售直通等战略行为具有严重影响。虽然Logit和线性模型意味着均衡通过率低于100%(Lee和Staelin称之为垂直战略替代(VSS))，但乘性模型意味着最佳通过率大于100%(垂直战略补充性(VSC))。由于促销通过率被发现低于或高于100%(Chvalier and Curhan 1976，Armstrong 1991)，我们实证检验了Logit(VSS)和乘法(VSC)函数形式对数据的适当性。我们对当地市场上最大的两家商店的酸奶和花生油类别进行了分析。我们发现，Logit的VSS含义比乘法模型更适合数据。我们还发现，对于这两个类别，最适合的模型是(1)零售商最大化类别利润，(2)VSI是制造商-Stackelberg，以及(3)制造商定价(HSI)是默契合谋的。零售商最大化品类利润的事实与理论预期是一致的。VSI是制造商-斯塔克尔伯格的推断反映了比赛时间的制度现实。零售商在制造商设定批发价之后才设定零售价。请注意，在我们分析的商店和产品类别中，这两家制造商拥有主导品牌，在酸奶市场和花生酱市场的市场份额加起来约为82%和65%。这一结果也与文献中的力量平衡论点一致。制造商定价默契合谋的发现与参与集中市场长期竞争的企业可以达成默契合谋的观点一致。管理者使用决策支持系统进行促销计划，这些系统通常会对VSI、HSI和函数形式做出假设。我们的分析结果对于判断这种决策支持系统中所作假设的适当性具有实质性的重要意义。
Consumer goods manufacturers usually sell their brands to consumers through common independent retailers. Theoretical research on such channel structures has analyzed the optimal behavior of channel members under alternative assumptions of manufacturer-retailer interaction (Vertical Strategic Interaction). Research in Empirical Industrial Organization has focused on analyzing the competitive interactions between manufacturers (Horizontal Strategic Interaction). Decision support systems have made various assumptions about retailer-pricing rules (e.g., constant markup, category-profit-maximization). The appropriateness of such assumptions about strategic behavior for any specific market, however, is an empirical question. This paper therefore empirically infers (1) the Vertical Strategic Interaction (VSI) between manufacturers and retailer, (2) the Horizontal Strategic Interaction (HSI) between manufacturers simultaneously with the VSI, and (3) the pricing rule used by a retailer.The approach is particularly appealing because it can be used with widely available scanner data, where there is no information on wholesale prices. Researchers usually have no access to wholesale prices. Even manufacturers, who have access to their own wholesale prices, usually have limited information on competitors' wholesale prices. In the absence of wholesale prices, we derive formulae for wholesale prices using game-theoretic solution techniques under the specific assumptions of vertical and horizontal strategic interaction and retailer-pricing rules. We then embed the formulae for wholesale prices into the estimation equations. While our empirical illustration is using scanner data without wholesale prices, the model itself can be applied when wholesale prices are available.Early research on the inference of HSI among manufacturers in setting wholesale prices using scanner data (e.g., Kadiyali et al. 1996, 1999) made the simplifying assumption that retailers charge a constant margin. This assumption enabled them to infer wholesale prices and analyze competitive interactions between manufacturers. In this paper, we show that this model is econometrically identical to a model that measures retail-price coordination across brands. Hence, the inferred cooperation among manufacturers could be exaggerated by the coordinated pricing (category management) done by the retailer. We find empirical support for this argument. This highlights the need to properly model and infer VSI simultaneously to accurately estimate the HSI when using data at the retail level.Functional forms of demand have been evaluated in terms of the fit of the model to sales data. But recent theoretical research on channels (Lee and Staelin 1997, Tyagi 1999) has shown that the functional form has serious implications for strategic behavior such as retail passthrough. While the logit and linear model implies equilibrium passthrough of less than 100% (Lee and Staelin call this Vertical Strategic Substitute (VSS)), the multiplicative model implies optimal passthrough of greater than 100% (Vertical Strategic Complement (VSC)). Because passthrough rates on promotions have been found to be below or above 100% (Chevalier and Curhan 1976, Armstrong 1991), we empirically test the appropriateness of the logit (VSS) and the multiplicative (VSC) functional form for the data.We perform our analysis in the yogurt and peanut butter categories for the two biggest stores in a local market. We found that the VSS implications of the logit fit the data better than the multiplicative model. We also find that for both categories, the best-fitting model is one in which (1) the retailer maximizes category profits, (2) the VSI is Manufacturer-Stackelberg, and (3) manufacturer pricing (HSI) is tacitly collusive. The fact that the retailer maximizes category profits is consistent with theoretical expectations. The inference that the VSI is Manufacturer-Stackelberg reflects the institutional reality of the timing of the game. Retailers set their retail prices after manufacturers set their wholesale prices. Note that in the stores and product categories that we analyze, the two manufacturers own the dominant brands with combined market shares of about 82% in the yogurt market and 65% in the peanut butter market. The result is also consistent with a balance of power argument in the literature. The finding that manufacturer pricing is tacitly collusive is consistent with the argument that firms involved in long-term competition in concentrated markets can achieve tacit collusion.Managers use decision support systems for promotion planning that routinely make assumptions about VSI, HSI, and the functional form. The results from our analysis are of substantive import in judging the appropriateness of assumptions made in such decision support systems.