Clinical psychologists' theory-based representations of mental disorders predict their diagnostic reasoning and memory.
Clinical psychologists' theory-based representations of mental disorders predict their diagnostic reasoning and memory.
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DOI：
10.1037/0096-3445.131.4.451
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发表时间：
2002-12
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Nancy S. Kim;W. Ahn
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Nancy S. Kim;W. Ahn
基于理论的分类模型假定概念被表示为理论，而不是特征列表。因此，有趣的是，《精神疾病诊断和统计手册》（第4版; DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association，1994）为精神障碍的诊断建立了一个理论指南。五个实验研究了临床医生如何处理非理论疾病分类。临床医生的因果理论的障碍和他们的诊断和记忆任务的反应进行了测量。根据他们的疾病理论，如果一个假设的病人有因果中心症状而不是因果外围症状，那么参与者更有可能诊断出该病人患有疾病。他们对因果中枢症状的记忆也有偏差。临床医生是认知驱动使用理论，尽管几十年的实践与非理论DSM。
The theory-based model of categorization posits that concepts are represented as theories, not feature lists. Thus, it is interesting that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) established atheoretical guidelines for mental disorder diagnosis. Five experiments investigated how clinicians handled an atheoretical nosology. Clinicians' causal theories of disorders and their responses on diagnostic and memory tasks were measured. Participants were more likely to diagnose a hypothetical patient with a disorder if that patient had causally central rather than causally peripheral symptoms according to their theory of the disorder. Their memory for causally central symptoms was also biased. Clinicians are cognitively driven to use theories despite decades of practice with the atheoretical DSM.