Pricing strategies for the site-dependent vehicle routing problem
Pricing strategies for the site-dependent vehicle routing problem
复制标题
站点相关车辆路径问题的定价策略
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Silvia Schwarze
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Silvia Schwarze
介绍了在车辆路径问题（VRP）中解决车辆观点的车辆定价博弈（VPG）。每辆车都是一个玩家，每公里都要收费。也就是说，车辆代表运输系统中分散的参与者，例如，分包合同下的承运人。基于这些价格，解决了VRP并产生了利润。考虑到车辆之间的竞争，车辆应该选择什么价格才能使自己的利润最大化？为了回答这个问题，网站的依赖性，导致不均匀的车辆。更详细的技能水平，例如，与车辆的大小有关，用以表示车辆执行特定服务的能力。此外，还增加了惩罚选项。VPG作为运输场景中的垂直协作的一个元素，从而为协作模型提供决策支持。的VPG的理论结果提供了一个特殊的情况下，两个玩家的环形网络游戏，为完整的平衡集的描述和他们的唯一性进行了讨论。它表明，高技能车辆的回报的唯一性是保证即使是多个均衡。竞争比是一个定义，它限制了汽车的价格，以保持其竞争力。此外，接受率给出了价格的下限，因此市场份额的损失仍然可以接受。实验结果提供了一般的网络，包括惩罚选项的分析。它表明，严格的网站依赖性的倾向导致垄断结构。此外，特定的处罚类型对通用技术车辆造成的负载不平衡显示出积极的影响。
The vehicle pricing game (VPG) which addresses the vehicles’ viewpoints within a vehicle routing problem (VRP) is introduced. Each vehicle acts as a player who demands a price per kilometer. That is, vehicles represent decentralized actors in transport systems, e.g., carriers under subcontracts. Based on these prices, a VRP is solved and profits are generated. Which price should a vehicle choose to maximize its own profit, considering the competition among vehicles? To answer this question, site dependencies leading to inhomogeneous vehicles are included. More detailed, skill-levels, e.g., relating to the size of a vehicle, are used to indicate a vehicle’s ability to carry out particular services. Moreover, penalty options are added. The VPG serves as an element of a vertical collaboration in a transport scenario and thus provides decision support for cooperative models. Theoretical results for the VPG are provided for a particular case of a two-player ring network game, for which the full set of equilibria is described and their uniqueness is discussed. It is shown that the uniqueness of the higher-skilled vehicle’s payoff is guaranteed even for multiple equilibria. The competition ratio is defined; it restricts a vehicle’s price to keep its competitiveness. Moreover, the acceptance ratio gives a lower bound on prices such that a loss of market share is still accepted. Experimental results are provided for general networks including the analysis of penalty options. It is demonstrated that strict site dependencies by tendency lead to monopolistic structures. In addition, particular penalty types show a positive effect regarding load imbalances caused by universally skilled vehicles.
影响因子：
2.7
作者：
Xin Wang-;H. Kopfer
通讯作者：
Xin Wang-;H. Kopfer