Meeting the Challenges of Representation and Accountability in Multi-party Governments
Meeting the Challenges of Representation and Accountability in Multi-party Governments
复制标题
应对多党政府中代表权和问责制的挑战
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Thomas M. Meyer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
W. Müller;Thomas M. Meyer
在比例立宪制中，政党扮演着双重角色。一方面，它们使授权和问责制发挥作用;另一方面，它们增加了授权制度的复杂性，因为少数群体的情况需要政党之间的合作。由于联合政府通常涉及政策妥协，问题是联合政党如何确保部长们坚持联合政府的协议。采用委托代理框架，本文表明，联盟可以使用几种控制机制来追求这一目标。作者考虑了事前机制，如政策协议，为未来的政策决定和部长候选人的联合筛选设定议程。接下来，他们讨论了事后机制的影响，如强有力的委员会制度和机构检查，如“看门狗”初级部长。他们采用一个简单的空间模型来说明这些工具是如何工作的。然而，使用控制机制并非没有成本，参与者可能希望避免这些成本。该条款规定了可能使用控制机制的条件。
In systems of proportional parliamentarism political parties play a double role. On the one hand they make delegation and accountability work; on the other they add complexity to the delegation regime, as minority situations require inter-party cooperation. Because coalition government usually involves policy compromises, the question arises how the coalition parties can ensure that the ministers stick to the coalition deal. Employing the principal–agent framework, this paper shows that coalitions can use several control mechanisms to pursue this goal. The authors consider ex ante mechanisms such as policy agreements that set the agenda for future policy decisions and coalition screening of ministerial candidates. Next they discuss the effects of ex post mechanisms such as strong committee systems and institutional checks like ‘watchdog’ junior ministers. Employing a simple spatial model, they illustrate how these instruments work. Using control mechanisms is not costless, however, and actors may want to avoid these costs. The article specifies conditions that make the use of control mechanisms likely to occur.